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M A T T H E W B I D W E L L A N D I S A B E L
F E R N A N D E Z - M A T E O
Introduction
There are many facets to the typical employment relationship. At its
very simplest, employment involves the exchange of labor for compen-
sation. Nevertheless, employment relationships also involve control of
the worker by the firm, the acquisition of skills through experience and
training, learning about each others’ qualities and intentions, and career
progression as the worker moves from role to role within the organiza-
tion. In addition, employment usually imposes a variety of specific legal
obligations on both employer and employee. Traditionally, these obli-
gations have been combined into a single relationship between worker
and firm.
In recent years, however, we have seen the growth of ‘‘triadic’’ employ-
ment arrangements, in which important characteristics of employment
are divided among workers’ relationships with two firms: a ‘‘client’’ and
an ‘‘intermediary.’’ The intermediary generally acts as the legal employer
of the worker, but the actual work is performed at a client site. Consider,
for example, employment relationships for temporary agency workers.
Legally, the worker is employed by the agency,1 which also provides the
worker with compensation and any benefits. Career progression for the
worker often results from the worker being assigned by the agency to
roles in different clients. The worker’s relationship with the client also
has clear elements of an employment tie, however: the worker provides
labor to the client at its site; the worker often also accepts substantial
control by the client over his or her work. We cannot therefore under-
stand how the worker is employed without examining both these ties.
Many other industries beyond temporary help agencies display ‘‘tria-
dic’’ features. The outsourcing of services often involves individuals
1 We use the terms ‘‘agency,’’ ‘‘intermediary,’’ and ‘‘staffing firm’’ interchangeably
throughout the chapter.
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working closely with a client firm and accepting control by them, while
also being employed by an outsourcing vendor. In professional services,
the roles of client and employer can become blurred as close relationships
with clients become a central determinant of workers’ career success. In
order to understand the nature of employment fully in many settings,
therefore, we need to look beyond traditional employer–worker dyads
and examine the nexus of relationships that surround the employment
ties in which workers are embedded. This chapter focuses on triadic
employment relationships that involve a labor market intermediary, a
worker, and a client firm.
We argue that the distinctive feature of triadic arrangements is that
they cannot be understood by examining each tie in isolation; the
different ties within the triad interact with each other. For all three
participants – workers, intermediaries, and clients – relationships with
one of these actors become a tool for managing their relationship with
the other. As a result, outcomes such as wages, task assignment, and
employment security can be understood only by referring to all three
relationships. In order to develop a nuanced understanding of these
arrangements, we draw on insights from the sociological literature on
exchange theory (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Blau, 1964) and our
qualitative analysis of three different studies of triadic employment
among high-skilled workers. We discuss the implications of this frame-
work for our conceptualization of new employment relationships more
generally.
Defining triadic employment arrangements
In triadic employment relationships, the traditional functions of the
employer are shared between the client company and the intermediary.
In the archetypal case of temporary help services, the agency is the legal
employer of record. It manages the screening, hiring, wage setting,
discontinuation of employment, and payment of benefits to the
worker. It is also responsible for the administrative aspects associated
with maintaining employees on payroll, such as retaining taxes, paying
wages, etc.
The client company usually has no contractual relationship with the
worker. It is closely involved in many aspects of the employment
relationship, however. Often the client will participate in the screening
and hiring processes, making final decisions on the candidates proposed
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to them by the agency. In addition, the client will usually be responsible
for all functions relating to the work, including task allocation, super-
vision of the workers, and even provision of specific training when
required. The work frequently takes place at the client’s site.
The details of triadic employment can vary along a number of related
dimensions, however, even within the same industry settings. First, there
is widespread variation in the stability of the worker’s relationship with
the intermediary. Some workers will expect to build long careers with
the same intermediary. Other workers’ relationships with the intermedi-
ary will last only as long as their assignment with a particular client.
Second, there is variation in whether the intermediary is expected to play
a role in managing the workers. Some intermediaries sell their services to
clients on the basis of their expert project management. Other interme-
diaries provide only the workers. Third, there is variation in whether
workers are expected to bring intermediary-specific knowledge to the
client, or whether they are being hired solely for general skills.
These variations make it difficult to construct a clear definition of
triadic employment relationships for the purposes of collecting statis-
tics on these arrangements. As a result, detailed statistics on the pre-
valence of triadic employment relationships are hard to come by. In
general, there seems to be a consensus that the importance of mediated
work arrangements in general – and agency employment in particular –
has increased considerably during the last decade (see Davidov, 2004).
According to a recent comparative survey, work through temporary
help agencies grew between two- and fivefold during the 1990s (Storrie,
2002, cited in Davidov, 2004). Estimates from various sources suggest
that this type of employment could account for as much as 2.7 percent
of the labor force in France, around 2 percent in the United Kingdom
and United States, and some 0.7 percent in Germany (Storrie, 2002).
Precise and comparable statistics on this issue are scarce, however.
In part, this absence of good data reflects the difficulty of defining
what exactly constitutes an employment relationship. In the United
States, for example, rather than having a single clear definition, courts
often rely on the answers to a ten- or even twenty-question test to decide
who a worker’s formal employer is (Muhl, 2002). Furthermore, the legal
status of workers involved in triadic employment relationships varies
across countries (see Davidov, 2004).
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics has made some attempt to count
the number of individuals in alternative employment arrangements
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through a biennial supplemental survey of workers, the Contingent and
Alternative Employment Arrangements Supplement to the Current
Population Survey (CPS). According to the 2005 survey, around
0.9 percent of workers are employed by temporary help agencies, and
a further 0.6 percent are employed by firms that contract out their
services to other companies. These numbers have remained fairly stable
over the ten years that the survey has been running. Given the difficul-
ties in cleanly defining these employment arrangements, however,
there is good reason to believe that these figures present a low estimate
of triadic employment in the US labor force.
Figures collected from industry-level employment data paint a very
different picture of the extent and growth of triadic employment.
According to figures provided by the BLS (see table 5.1), temporary
help firms employed 2.4 million individuals in 2006, representing
around 1.8 percent of the labor force. Professional employer organiza-
tions, which provide long-term staffing services for businesses,
employed a further 700,000. Large numbers of workers were also
employed in computer systems design, management and technical con-
sulting services and business support services, all of which often involve
employees working very closely with clients over long periods of time
such that the client takes on some characteristics of the employer.
Perhaps most strikingly, the BLS figures reveal rapid growth in the
industries that make widespread use of triadic employment relation-
ships. Temporary help services grew by 121 percent between 1990
and 2006. Computer systems design services grew by 202 percent.
Professional employer organizations, which serve as employers of record
for entire company workforces, grew by an impressive 621 percent.
Hence, while triadic employment relationships may still be the exception
rather than the norm, they are present in a significant and rapidly
growing portion of the US labor market.
It is most likely that this growth in triadic employment relationships
reflects a growing trend towards more arm’s-length, market-mediated
ties between firms and workers (Cappelli, 1999; Osterman, 1999). In
response to increased competition in product markets, greater pres-
sures from shareholders, and reduced government regulation, firms
have sought to increase their flexibility by limiting their obligations
to workers (Pfeffer and Baron, 1988; Cappelli, 1995). Much of the
growth of intermediaries can be explained by the need to manage
functions that employers have abandoned. We review the many
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functions that intermediaries provide in the next section. Some growth
is also likely to be a response to employment law. A variety of different
laws within the United States create obligations between employers and
employees (Muhl, 2002). Firms must pay a number of employment taxes
and withhold taxes from their employees’ pay. In addition, the US tax
code requires employers to offer benefits to their employees in order for
them to receive favorable tax treatment. As a result, employers can be
liable to pay benefits to workers who the courts find to be their employ-
ees, as happened in the Microsoft vs. Vizcaino case (Monthly Labor
Review, 1998). Finally, anti-discrimination legislation and other legal
innovations have seriously eroded the ‘‘employment at will’’ doctrine
within the United States, making the termination of employment a much
more difficult prospect for firms (Autor, 2003). Stephen Barley and
Gideon Kunda (2004) argue that client firms often hire workers though
an intermediary to shield themselves from these legal obligations.2
Table 5.1 Employment growth in industries with triadic employment
arrangements, 1990–2006 (thousands of employees)
Industry January 2006 January 1990 Percentage change
Employment placement
agencies
289 209 38
Temporary help services 2429 1097 121
Professional employer
organizations
699 97 621
Computer systems design
and related services
1222.6 405.2 202
Management and
technical consulting
services
856.3 310.6 176
Business support services 752.7 497 51
Total non-farm
employment
132328 107532 23
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2 Obviously, when intermediaries function as legal employers of these contractors
they are the ones shouldering the employment risks. In these cases, however, it
is common for the client to pay a premium to hire agency temps, so the ‘‘costs’’ are
ultimately born by the clients as well. Nonetheless, the intermediaries are usually
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Merely defining workers as independent contractors does not guarantee
that courts will not judge a client firm to be their legal employers, but
when workers are hired through an intermediary many lawyers believe
that client firms are much less likely to be defined as employers.
Toward an understanding of triadic employment
arrangements
The increasing importance of alternative employment relationships
has motivated a number of studies that examine the different features
of these non-standard work arrangements. Many of these studies
have focused on understanding when and why firms choose to use
external employees such as temporary help agency workers and out-
sourced personnel (e.g. Abraham, 1990; Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993;
Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Houseman, 2001; Gramm and Schnell,
2001; Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek, 2003). Many of these
studies find that a key reason for firms to use external workers is to
achieve greater ‘‘numerical flexibility’’ to meet seasonal or uncertain
demand, or to fill positions left vacant due to sickness or vacations.
Temporary employment also allows firms to screen potential full-time
hires (see Autor, 2001), as well as to bypass some internal adminis-
trative controls on recruiting, such as hiring freezes, rigid pay scales,
unionization, or the requirement to pay benefits (Houseman, 2001).
A second stream of research has focused on the consequences of
externalized employment for workers and firms. These studies suggest
that contingent work, compared to regular employment, is associated
with more of the characteristics of ‘‘bad jobs,’’ such as low pay and lack
of benefits (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson, 2000), that contingent
workers have less organizational commitment than regular employees
(Van Dyne and Ang, 1998; Ang and Slaughter, 2001), and that the use
of external workers can lead regular employees to have poorer relation-
ships with peers and supervisors and increase their intentions to quit
(Broschak and Davis-Blake, 2006).
Recent research has also begun to explore the actions and role of
intermediaries in these markets, such as IT staffing firms (Barley and
Kunda, 2004) and executive search firms (Finlay and Coverdill, 2000).
This research emphasizes the variety of functions that intermediaries
better able to bear these costs, as they usually offer lower benefits as well as
offering short-term employment to all their employees.
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perform in the labor market, such as matching workers to firms,
negotiating pay (Barley and Kunda, 2004), and screening workers for
clients (Autor, 2001). Studies have also examined the broader impacts
of these intermediaries in helping certain groups of workers to advance
their careers (Bielby and Bielby, 1999) and shaping how client firms are
able to achieve greater employment flexibility (Davis-Blake and
Broschak, 2000).
These studies provide detailed insights into the causes and conse-
quences of these new employment arrangements. They also provide
some indication of how various aspects of employment relationships
are ‘‘taken over’’ by employment intermediaries. None of them fully
explores the consequences of the triadic nature of these settings, how-
ever. Instead, most studies tend to examine one set of relationships at a
time: the relationship between worker and client; the relationship
between worker and agency; or the relationship between agency and
client. The distinctive feature of triadic employment relationships,
however, is that all three ties are intimately involved in shaping how
workers are employed. As a consequence, focusing on any one relation-
ship within the triad can deny some of the most important dynamics
that shape that relationship.
This point was made long ago by sociological studies on the structure
of interactions among actors. The German sociologist Georg Simmel
(see Wolff, 1950) was the first to point out, in an article published in
1902, that the underlying social structure of triadic interactions is
fundamentally different from that of dyadic ones. He argued that, as
one additional actor is involved in a transaction, the quality and the
dynamics of how the parties interact with each other change. In parti-
cular, ties bound by a third party give each actor less autonomy, less
power, and less independence in relating to the other members of the
triad (Krackhardt, 1999). The study of social networks has drawn
heavily on this insight to suggest that the way that any single relation-
ship behaves depends on the broader network of ties in which it is
embedded (Burt, 1992; Gargiulo, 1993). That is, the terms of the
exchange depend not only on the characteristics of the specific relation
that is the focus of the exchange but also on the ties that each partner
has to the other actors (Baron and Hannan, 1994).
One way to conceptualize the distinctive dynamics of triadic employ-
ment arrangements is to examine how the actors use the different ties as
a resource for strategic action. Any relationship can be understood
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as the outcome of two parties seeking to minimize the costs and max-
imize the benefits that they can obtain. In triadic relationships, each of
the actors has an additional resource to use in its interactions with a
second party: its ties to the third party. Hence, workers might leverage
their ties with the intermediary in order to improve the terms of their
relationship with the client; they might also leverage their ties with the
client in bargaining with the intermediary. The other ties in the triad
similarly provide resources to intermediaries and clients in dealing with
workers. This idea is consistent with social exchange theory (Cook and
Emerson, 1978; Blau, 1964), which argues that the actors involved in a
given exchange can draw on their actual or potential ties to other actors
as an additional resource. In the remainder of this chapter we present
the results of qualitative research that seeks to identify and to under-
stand these interactions among the different relationships within
employment triads. We discuss how actors might, at different times,
seek to strengthen relationships (which leads to what we call ‘‘reinfor-
cement’’) or to weaken them (which we call ‘‘balancing’’).3
Data and methods
Our data comes from three complementary field studies of triadic ties
in high-skill contract labor markets. The figures combine depth and
breadth, as they include extensive observations from a number of diverse
settings as well as intensive interviews and quantitative data collection
within each setting. We integrate two in-depth studies of particular
institutional actors – a staffing agency and a client firm – with a broad
study of all three participants in the market. The fieldwork was imple-
mented in the market for high-skill information technology contractors,
broadly defined. The staffing firm (‘‘the agency’’) we studied is a global
company headquartered in the United States that specializes in placing
‘‘creative’’ IT professionals. We also analyzed the use of contractors
within the IT department of a large US financial services firm (‘‘the
3 These correspond closely to the concept of network polarity within social
exchange theory (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992), which classifies ties as positively
or negatively connected, depending on how they interact. Ties are positively
connected when the magnitude of one exchange in which an actor is involved
produces or implies an increase in a second exchange. Conversely, ties are
negatively connected when an increase in the frequency or magnitude of one
exchange produces a decrease in the second exchange (Emerson, 1972).
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bank’’). These two in-depth studies are complemented by a third set of
cross-firm interviews with agencies, consultants, and clients across a
range of different settings that focused on understanding the range of
different employment relationships in the IT consulting industry. See
table 5.2 for a summary of our data collection and methods.
Study 1: the agency
The agency is a large, global staffing firm that specializes in placing
workers with creative, technical, and Web-based skills. The firm is
headquartered in a major US city and has subsidiaries in more than
ten countries – although our study focuses on the United States alone.
The agency operates by matching workers to projects in client firms.
It holds a database with extensive information both on contractors
looking for projects and on companies looking for workers.4 The
matching begins with the agency receiving an order from a client, and
searching its database to find someone that fits the assignment descrip-
tion. This results in a simultaneous matching process whereby candi-
dates are offered potential assignments and clients typically are
presented with a selection of résumés. At the same time, price negotia-
tions begin between the agency and the client company. Contractors
are paid a percentage of the billing rate the agency receives from the
client. Generally the workers do not get to know how much the agency
is billing the client for its services, and they rarely have a chance to
negotiate wages. Moreover, as part of their general agreement to work
together, the agency explicitly advises both client and contractor not to
discuss billing rates and wages (Barley and Kunda, 2004, provide a
detailed discussion of this issue).
Once the three parties have reached an agreement, the contractor
starts working at the client firm’s site,5 usually alongside the company’s
4 We use the terms ‘‘contractors’’ and ‘‘workers’’ interchangeably throughout the
chapter.
5 The majority of triadic employment relationships that we analyzed at the agency
consisted of individuals working as contractors at the client company’s site. The
study of the agency did not focus on arrangements in which contractors perform a
project for the client firm but work off-site in their own office or studio (see Kunda,
Barley, and Evans, 2002, for some examples of this type of relationship). We
interviewed a few such independent contractors, who usually charge a lump sum
for their work, but most of our analysis is limited to the far more common cases in
which contractors work alongside the client firm’s regular employees.
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Table 5.2 Summary of three studies of triadic relationships
The agency The bank The market for IT consulting
Study setting US office of global staffing
agency
IT department of large US
financial services firm
Variety of clients, consultants
and agencies in IT service
market
Types of workers IT-related graphical design
services
IT professionals (systems and
software developers)
IT professionals (systems and
software developers)
Types of agency
services
Short-term staffing of workers to
clients
Staffing of workers to clients;
management of development
projects
Short-term staffing of workers to
clients; management of
development projects
Research
methods
Periodic field observation;
interviews; analysis of agency
records
Periodic field observation;
interviews; surveys; analysis of
contracts
Interviews
Quantitative data Job histories of 251 individuals
placed by the agency in 457
clients (1480 projects) over
5 years
Survey data on the staffing and
management of 57 software
development projects
Informants Placement agents, contractors,
industry experts
Senior managers, sourcing
managers, project managers,
developers
Convenience and snowball
sample of clients, consultants,
agency managers, industry
experts
Number of
interviews
45 62 (plus 57 in-person surveys) 36
regular employees. The staffing firm is the ‘‘employer of record,’’ which
means that the worker is formally employed by the intermediary and has
no contractual relationship with the client. The client firm pays a fee to
the agency – usually per hour of work – for the contractor’s services, and
the agency in turn pays the worker – also hourly. When the worker
receives benefits, these are provided by the staffing firm, not by the client.
Formally, the staffing firm is also in charge of supervising the contrac-
tor’s work and solving any problems that may arise in the relationship. In
practice, however, project managers usually deal directly with contrac-
tors on a day-to-day basis.6 Most projects have an established duration –
usually a few days or months – but sometimes they are open-ended or are
regularly renewed. As a norm, contractors do not receive a salary when
they are not assigned to a project by the staffing firm, and often workers
are registered with several intermediaries at the same time.
Our data collection at the agency focused particularly on under-
standing the consequences of triadic employment relationships from
the perspective of the worker, but it also aimed to study the internal
functioning of labor market intermediaries. We studied the agency over
the course of fifteen months. During this period we carried out repeat
interviews with the agency’s placement agents and, around three times
a week, we observed their activities for three to four hours a day. As
well as observing the agency, we implemented a series of interviews
with individuals who had been affiliated with the agency at some point
in their careers, and others who had worked as contractors in this sector
but never joined this particular agency.7 This involved interviews with
forty-five individuals, some of whom were interviewed several times.
The sample includes thirty-seven contractors (twenty-six of whom had
been affiliated with the agency at some point, although not necessarily
at the time of the interview), four placement agents at the agency, and
two industry experts.8
6 By actively managing the external worker, the client runs the risk of being found to
be the legal employer of the worker. The demands of smoothly coordinating the
work, however, generally require that clients become closely involved in external
workers’ day-to-day activities.
7 The former were contacted through the agency’s managers, while the latter were
members of several professional and industry associations in the local area of the
agency’s headquarters.
8 Besides this qualitative data, we also collected a wealth of quantitative information
on contractors’ job histories. We assembled a data set from a variety of sources
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Study 2: the bank
The bank is a large financial services institution based in the United
States. Our study focused on its IT department, which employed over
10,000 people and was responsible for developing and maintaining all
the systems that the bank used to conduct its business. At the time of the
study, around one-third of the developers at the bank were external
workers employed under a triadic employment relationship. These
external workers fell into three broad categories. T&Ms (time and
materials consultants) were hired through staffing firms, but were
managed exclusively by managers at the bank. Integrators were
employees of consulting firms, which took a more direct role in mana-
ging projects, contributing significant institutional expertise. These
workers were most likely to be engaged by the bank for very highly
skilled work, often involving system design and interaction with the
business. Finally, offshore workers were employed by foreign organi-
zations and were usually physically located overseas, commonly in
India, to carry out basic, lower-skilled development work. We studied
how the bank managed these three types of external workers through
interviews with sixty-two individuals at all levels of the organization,
and a structured survey of fifty-seven project managers that examined
how they managed internal and external workers.
Study 3: organizational forms adopted by intermediaries
The third study was a broad exploration of the relationships of all three
participants in the market for IT consultants. Where our studies of the
bank and the agency focused on gaining in-depth insights into particular
organizational actors, this study sought to understand the variety of
different kinds of organizations and relationships present in the market
for IT consulting. In particular, we were interested in understanding
the variety of organizational forms adopted by the intermediaries, and
their implications for the relationship with clients and workers. We
provided by the agency (paper résumés, client information, demographic data,
project characteristics, prices, etc.), as well as public information on size and
industry classification of clients (see Bidwell and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006, for a full
description of our quantitative data). We have comprehensive information on 251
individuals who were placed in 457 different companies between 1998 and 2002,
making a total of 1,480 assignments.
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interviewed thirty-six informants, including eight consultants, twelve
managers of intermediaries, twelve clients and three industry analysts
drawn from a convenience sample of clients, consultants, and interme-
diaries, based on personal contacts and referrals. These informants were
associated with a wide variety of different kinds of intermediaries, from
those firms that focused purely on staffing to organizations that also
sought to provide project management and other institutional expertise
to their clients. They were mainly located in the north-east of the United
States. We also attended three industry conferences for IT staffing firms.
Data collection and analysis
Our qualitative data collection process consisted of both fieldwork
observations and the implementation of semi-structured interviews.
The interviews ranged from thirty minutes to two hours, with the
average being one hour. We asked open-ended questions, which varied
depending on the type of interviewee – worker, client, placement agent,
etc. – but in all cases we paid special attention to the relationships
among the three parties.
We analyzed these interviews by carefully reading and re-reading
our transcripts and field notes, and by using a computer-assisted qua-
litative analysis tool (Atlas.ti). We used an iterative data analysis
process (as described in Glaser and Strauss, 1967, and Miles and
Huberman, 1994) in order to build a simple inductive framework for
analyzing the different interactions among the participants.
Results: the impact of triadic interactions on employment
outcomes
In analyzing our interviews, we find that there were many instances of
our informants – unprompted – discussing how one tie would shape the
way another tie was formed and managed. These interactions varied
along three important dimensions: (1) who was involved in managing
the relationships; (2) the kind of outcomes that were affected, including
pay, task allocation, and job security; and (3) whether the actors were
attempting to reinforce their relationships or balance one relationship
with another. We focus on the latter dimension in order to organize the
discussion of our findings, since we are interested in the dynamic aspect
of how triadic ties interact with each other.
154 Matthew Bidwell, Isabel Fernandez-Mateo
Reinforcement
The most common pattern of interactions within the triad involved
using one tie to strengthen, or ‘‘reinforce,’’ another. Quite often actors
benefited from strong ties to other actors. In these cases they tried to use
this strong tie with one of the parties in order to forge a stronger tie with
the other – a process of reinforcement. Such behavior would result in all
three ties within the triad becoming stronger, a situation that social
exchange theorists describe as ‘‘positive polarity’’ among ties (Cook and
Whitmeyer, 1992). In this context, we use the term ‘‘strengthening’’ (and
the reverse: ‘‘weakening’’) to mean mostly four things: creating a new tie;
increasing the tangible and intangible resource flows that are exchanged
through a tie (i.e. information, material resources, reputation); increasing
the control that the actor has over the terms of the relationship; or
increasing the probability of future transactions. Although each of these
outcomes is somewhat different, we felt them to be sufficiently similar
that we could collapse them into a single dimension.9
Actor 2 Actor 3
Target tie  Goal of
actor 1 is to make
changes to the nature of
his/her relationship with
actor 3
Leveraging tie  The nature of
actor 1’s relationship with
actor 2 affects how actor 1
manages his/her relationship
with actor 3
Interaction
Actor 1
Figure 5.1 Defining interactions within a triad
9 To some extent, all these outcomes signal an increase (or decrease) in the tangible
and intangible resources that flow through a tie. Establishing a new tie increases the
resource flow from zero to some other amount, while increasing the probability of
future exchange contributes to a growing flow of resources between the actors at
some point in the future. Control could be conceptualized in part as the increased
ability of an actor in the relationship to dictate the terms of the exchange, which can
be thought of as a consequence of this actor having some resource that the other
party values (Emerson, 1976). This conceptualization of relationships as exchange
networks closely resembles that of social exchange theorists (Cook and Emerson,
1978; Blau, 1964).
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Reinforcing behavior was pervasive throughout these triadic sys-
tems. We have found examples of it between each of the pairs of ties.
We also observe how such reinforcement behaviors contributed to
shape a variety of employment terms, including pay, task assignment,
and job security. We present examples of these processes below.
Bridging and buffering: reinforcement between client–agency
and client–worker ties
All accounts of triadic labor markets begin with the idea that clients
leverage their tie with an agency to build a tie with a worker. When
clients lack the networks that will help them to recruit workers for short-
term assignments they turn instead to agencies, the wider networks of
which allow them to propose workers for the position (e.g. Barley and
Kunda, 2004). This is the most obvious function of an intermediary:
working as a broker by matching workers to firms. Not surprisingly,
such brokerage behavior was pervasive throughout the markets we
looked at. In most cases, clients would use agencies to find potential
contractors, but then do the final selection themselves. In some cases,
when the client had a strong enough relationship with an agency, they
might instead rely on that agency to perform all the screening for them.
For example, managers at the agency we studied mentioned during
informal conversations that some clients trusted their judgment on
WorkerClient
+
Agency
Client–agency, client–worker
Figure 5.2 Bridging and buffering
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candidates so much that they did not get involved in the selection of
candidates at all.
The influence of the agency on the relationships between client and
worker extended well beyond its most obvious brokerage function of
matching workers to jobs, however. In fact, both workers and clients
used agencies to buffer themselves against a variety of risks associated
with their ongoing relationship. Agencies facilitated a relationship
between client and worker that would otherwise be too risky.
At the most basic level, clients use agencies to buffer them against
legal risks. A concern for many clients was that they could be legally
classified as the employer of a consultant, and therefore held respon-
sible for withholding taxes from and paying benefits to the worker (see
Barley and Kunda, 2004, for a detailed explanation of this issue). As a
consequence, clients might insist that workers who approached them
be employed by an external agency, even though that agency would
have played no role in finding the worker. For example, one consultant
told us:
I started working for [the client] as an intern. Then they wanted to bring me
on as an employee, but they couldn’t get an employee req [requisition form
approved]. Instead they called up [the agency] and told them to hire me.
Agencies also protect clients from risks related to workers by guar-
anteeing their performance. In some cases clients would sign a contract
with the agency for the specific work to be performed. If for some
reason the worker fails to perform, its relationship with the agency
ensures that the work will be completed. In explaining why he pre-
ferred to deal with larger agencies that would take responsibility for the
work rather than independent contractors, one client said that
larger firms do have extra resources to call on. If you have a small company or
individual and they get pneumonia for two weeks, then you are in real
trouble. With a larger company, they have back-up project management to
make sure that work does get delivered rapidly and on time.
In both these examples, the presence and nature of the agency–client
relationship was critical to the formation of a client–worker relation-
ship. Moreover, clients also used agencies to manage their relationship
with the workers on an ongoing basis. Perhaps the most extreme
example of this was the way that clients used their relationship with
agencies to manage wage reductions. As the literature on internal labor
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markets makes clear, it is extremely unusual for firms to reduce the
wages of regular employees (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstrom, 1994). During the period 2000–2002, however,
demand for IT workers fell sharply in many areas, leading clients to
attempt to cut expenditure by reducing consultants’ pay. The fact that
consultants were formally employed by third-party agencies facilitated
these attempts; by positioning the rate cuts as inter-firm transactions,
clients were able to reduce the damage to their relationships with the
workers. As one client described:
In fall 2001 we had our first line of reductions. We left it to the vendors as to
how to manage it. We just told them: ‘‘We want a 10 to 20 percent reduction
in your overall bill rate – you figure out how to do it.’’ We told them that
10 percent was the absolute minimum reduction we wanted, and if they got
as high as 20 percent they would make us very happy.
Brokering the broker: reinforcement between worker–agency
and worker–client ties
Just as clients use agencies for more than simply finding a qualified
worker, so workers use agencies for more than simply finding work.
Indeed, we find that there were a number of situations in which
workers chose to build a relationship through an agency despite
having an existing relationship with the client. As we have seen,
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Figure 5.3 Brokering the broker
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clients often like to involve agencies in their relationships because of
the guarantee this provides about the quality of the work. At times,
therefore, workers need to involve an agency in order to maintain and
strengthen an existing tie with a client. For example, one manager at
an agency explained how workers can act as brokers, introducing an
agency to a client in order to shore up their own relationship with the
client:
We had a key number two or number three player on a piece of work, where
they contracted to us for the first time, as a try-out, if you will. They [the two
contract employees] did well. They had access to another client. Tenuous
access. But access. It was then much easier to walk in with a portfolio of [the
agency’s] projects, rather than for John to come back and say I have a ragtag
team of folks, and I can assemble a team. Instead he would introduce me. And
that’s all I had as well. Except I had a body of work, a reference list, and my
references were all CFOs [chief financial officers]. So when you pick up a
phone, and you get a call in to a CFO, who can then tell you: ‘‘I’ve hired these
people three or four times.’’
Alternatively, workers might choose to work through an agency
because of the increased security from ties to a firm that would find
them work and provide them with secure pay. When clients wanted to
hire these workers, they would have to do so through that agency, even
when they had a pre-existing link with them.
Once they started working with the client, workers could exploit
their ties with the agency they were using in order to strengthen their
relationship with the client. In particular, the agency could be an
important source of feedback for the worker about how the job was
progressing. For example, one worker described how
I e-mail them [the agency] when I need something, or they e-mail me when
they need something, I always ask them to give me [the client] feedback, and
they are always like, you know, they love you, everything is great, you know.
We find that there were very tangible ways in which this reinforce-
ment behavior benefited workers. In a separate analysis of wage and
billing rates at the agency we studied, we show that workers with long-
standing relationships with the agency were able to command higher
bill rates from the client, and higher wages overall (Bidwell and
Fernandez-Mateo, 2006). Longer relationships with workers allowed
the agency to learn about their strengths and weaknesses, and therefore
provide a better fit with client needs. This better alignment improved
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the quality of the worker–client relationships, and therefore the
amount that clients were willing to pay for a worker.
Reinforcement also occurred when workers leveraged their ties to
clients to improve their relationships with an agency. The most obvious
way to achieve this was to ensure that agencies received feedback from
the clients when jobs were going well, so that the agencies would be more
likely to choose them on future assignments. As one consultant said:
I mean, you make sure that the people you are working for they like what you
do and they call up [the agency] and they say: ‘‘Oh boy, did he do a good job’’ –
you know, stuff like that.
A means to an end: reinforcement between agency–worker
and agency–client ties
While accounts of triadic employment relationships have tended to
focus on how the participants – especially intermediaries – achieve
the right client–worker match, the three actors are at the same time
actively managing their other relationships. Success for agencies
depends largely on how they manage their relationships with their
clients. When the agency–worker tie is a critical resource in managing
client relationships, these ties become reinforcing.
For example, agencies would use workers to build relationships with
clients by deciding whom to assign to a particular client. These staffing
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decisions are not just a case of finding the best fit between worker and
job; the nature of the relationship with the client shapes which workers
are selected by the agency to work there. For example, if an agency was
trying to build a reputation with a new client it would send a worker
whom it knew well and trusted to do a good job, in order to make a good
impression on the client. As one placement agent told us about new
clients:
I might place the good one there in order to give them a great first
impression of [the agency] so they keep doing business with us.
Alternatively, following a failed placement, an agency would try to
ensure the next person that it sent was somebody with whom it had an
established relationship, and could be trusted to do a good job. As one
such worker told us:
You can always try to send them a good talent to mend things up. I do
a lot of that, like I’ve been sent in to a lot of difficult clients, or I have
been sent in to a lot of situations when they want to win a client over.
Close relationships with workers could help agencies to woo clients
in other ways. In particular, workers can be a valuable source of
information about clients for agencies, helping placement agents to
do more deals. This is another reason for agencies to assign workers
with whom they have close relationships to key clients. As one place-
ment agent explained:
We are not in the client, so we need someone to help me understand
their structure, the organizational chart. We use for that the talent
we place there as well, in order to get a better understanding of the
company and see what might be the next step for us to expand.
Such dynamics had important consequences for how ties between
clients and workers were built. What kind of job they were matched to
was not just a function of workers’ skills and the requirements of the
job; the nature of agencies’ relationships with particular clients also
influenced how workers were assigned to jobs.
The need for agencies to build strong client relationships also shaped
their ties with workers. To the extent that close relationships with
contractors helped agencies to win business, they were more likely to
build strong ties to these workers. The need to reinforce client relation-
ships could therefore induce agencies to put workers on a salary. Many
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of the agencies had arm’s-length relationships with their workers,
paying them only when they were able to find a job for them. Such an
arrangement reduced the agencies’ costs, as they did not have to pay the
workers for ‘‘bench time’’ when they had not been placed; it also had its
disadvantages, however. Without the expectation of a long-term rela-
tionship with an agency, workers had less incentive to represent that
agency in the best light, and were more likely to seek work elsewhere.
As the client’s relationship with that agency became more dependent
on the skills and performance of the workers it supplied, the agency
would be more likely to employ them on a full-time basis. Doing this
would also ‘‘bind’’ the workers to some extent, as they would no longer
be able to have arrangements with other agencies if they were receiving
a full-time salary.
We find that this strengthening of the agency–worker relationship
was particularly evident when agencies presented themselves to clients
as managing the overall delivery of the services. In these circumstances,
agencies wanted to be able to present key workers as possessing the
expertise necessary for the project. As it became necessary to draw on
this expertise with increasing frequency, it also became necessary to
employ these workers full-time. Similarly, when agencies were respon-
sible for the delivery of projects, they might feel that the risks involved
in arm’s-length relationships with their staff were too great. As one
manager in a high-end consulting firm told us:
People don’t feel comfortable going into battle with a lot of mercen-
aries. When the going gets tough, they are not going to stick around.
Similarly, we don’t tend to do easy projects. If they were easy, then
the clients would do them themselves. We don’t want people to run
away when the project gets tough, and that is the concern with
contractors.
To the extent that workers could directly affect the client relation-
ship, they were more likely to be made employees of an agency. As
another manager at the same integrator firm put it:
Where we use contractors most is where we have the most control
of them. This is where [the agency] has been given a job to build a
complete system to deliver to the client, and is building it on our own
premises. In these cases, if a contractor doesn’t shape up then it is
pretty easy for us to take corrective action.
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I feel much more nervous about using contractors at the client site.
Then they get introduced to the client, get to know people, and we are
much more exposed. All of our people have been rigorously screened,
but not the contractors. Having them there starts to muddy the water.
Finally, the need to build client relationships could lead the agencies
not only to build long-term relationships with the workers but also to
train and certify them in new technologies. As the manager of another
integrator explained to us:
Almost everybody is certified. [The agency] will pay for our staff’s
certification . . . It is an additional feature in your sales. Many of the
certification levels in Java and so on are actually pretty rigorous.
They give a sense to clients that the people really do know their stuff.
The clients don’t have to worry about it.
Just as the client–agency tie could provide a motive for agencies to
strengthen their ties with their workers, it could also provide a resource
for such strengthening. A simple way that agencies achieved this was by
providing workers with as much information as possible about the
client. This information helped the worker to prepare for the assign-
ment and eased the transition into the new job. As the assignment
progressed, regular updates about what was happening at the client
company could be useful to the workers. The provision of such infor-
mation was, therefore, an important service that agencies could offer to
the workers, and one that would differentiate them from other agencies
(and potentially win over good contract workers). It was also some-
thing that contractors often commented on:
When I worked with [a specific agent], she was amazing, she went to
check out everything, she would tell me what they were like, she
would tell me what the place is like. She would tell me, you know,
how to get there, if there was parking . . . she was very amenable to
all the things that would affect me – she was amazing.
On occasion, agencies might also leverage their relationships with
clients in more substantial ways to help manage their ties with workers.
Given that the client ultimately shaped the conditions of work, agents
needed to work with these clients to manage how they improved rewards
for workers. An agency’s relationship with a client could therefore be
used to improve things for the worker. There were examples of such
behavior at the bank we studied, where the close relationship between
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the client and the offshore vendors meant that the bank would be
relatively responsive in helping the vendors to manage their relationships
with the workers. One of the bank’s managers gave us an example of this:
Now that I have worked with these people [outsourcing vendors]
repeatedly, I can guess who the people on the other side will be. I can
cut them slack in how they do the work. If they want to fly someone
over to do something, I’ll let them, even if it is not strictly needed for
the project, because it might help to reward and develop the indivi-
dual. I am happy to do this sort of thing as long as the work comes in
under budget.
Balancing
Although strong relationships often benefited the actors within the
triad, this was not always the case. Sometimes, strong ties could expose
actors to significant costs and risks. For example, relationships with
workers might create legal liabilities for clients. This would mostly be
due to the risk that contractors – even those hired through agencies –
might be classified as employees in the case of a legal dispute. In such a
case, agencies would be liable for any benefits awarded to these work-
ers (see Monthly Labor Review, 1998). Similarly, the mere existence of
a relationship with an intermediary implies that workers and agencies
have to pay a price for its services. When these risks and costs become
high, actors might seek to use their other relationships to minimize
the costs and risks, thereby effectively weakening relationships.
We describe these effects as ‘‘balancing behavior’’ (Emerson, 1962;
Gargiulo, 1993), in which a stronger relationship with one of the actors
actually leads to a weaker relationship with the other one. Once again,
such behavior was widespread among all three actors, and had con-
sequences for a variety of employment outcomes.
Disintermediation: balancing between client–worker
and agency–worker ties
Many accounts of triadic labor markets paint the intermediary as the
tertius gaudens, who gains rents from bringing two previously sepa-
rated parties together (see Wolff, 1950; Burt, 1992; Marsden, 1982).
A clear corollary of such a framing is that, once introduced, it is in the
interest of the other two parties to remove the broker from the triad.
Disintermediating the broker in this way allows the other two parties to
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share the rents previously appropriated by the broker – in this case the
agency fee.
Attempts at such disintermediation were an important feature of tria-
dic labor markets. In most cases, agencies would write contracts with
clients that forbade the client from hiring the worker directly without
compensating the agency, or would introduce a non-compete clause that
committed the worker and the client to not contracting directly among
themselves for a period of time – usually one year – after the intermediary
had matched them. In fact, such clauses and provisions are generally part
of the business model used by most labor market intermediaries (see also
Barley and Kunda, 2004). Furthermore, cases of disintermediation were
taken very seriously by agencies, which might even sue workers or clients
who broke non-compete agreements. For example, during the course of
our research at the agency we studied, one of the agents learned that a
contractor had signed a direct agreement with a client the agency had
assigned them to a few weeks earlier. Pandemonium ensued. Placement
agents shouted at each other, made frantic calls to the agency’s lawyers,
and threatened client and worker with legal action unless some kind of
monetary agreement was reached. Needless to say, ties with both client
and contractor were immediately severed.
Even where non-compete clauses are respected by all participants,
such legal devices cannot always prevent disintermediation. For
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Figure 5.5 Disintermediation
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example, such contracts are ineffective when individuals from the
client firm moved companies. As one contractor told us:
When a CFO would leave [their current job], having established a
personal relationship with one or two players, they understood that
the contract house was merely making a large margin, so they were
more than happy to deal with me or others directly, because it
lowered their cost basis, and we were known entities, so you could
walk into an environment and bring a new CFO to this environment
up to speed within two weeks’ time.
We also saw many instances of partial disintermediation – that is,
attempts to minimize agencies’ role in the relationship without remov-
ing them altogether. An example of this is when workers attempt to
negotiate pay and conditions directly with their clients rather than
going through agencies. In some cases, such partial disintermediation
represents a clear attempt by the two parties to reduce the agencies’ rents
from the transaction.10 In other cases, though, partial disintermedia-
tion reflects the fact that as the clients and the workers get to know each
other they become more likely to resolve issues directly between them-
selves in a timelier and more efficient manner. These two faces of
disintermediation mean that agencies have complex reactions to the
phenomenon. For example, one agency manager told us:
In my firm, more than 90 percent of the consultants are salaried,
benefited and have tenure. Because of this, I frown on them going to
the client directly to discuss their rate. In previous years, though,
they would come back to me and say: ‘‘My rate is below the market.’’
This should not be the client’s problem. Instead, the agency should
continually be in touch with its consultants to ensure that any
problems are rapidly resolved.
By contrast, we came across cases in which partial disintermediation
directly benefited the agency. According to one contractor:
10 In fact, our quantitative work suggests that workers who are able to establish
stronger relationships with clients extract higher rents from the agency (Bidwell
and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006). When workers have performed several
engagements with the client in the past, retaining their services becomes
important for the agency in maintaining its tie with the client. As a result, the
agency would pass significantly more of its billings on to the workers.
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When I worked for this financial company for almost one year I
thought, well, I am becoming very valuable for them, and I think we
can up the pay rate, so I spoke to my boss at the client directly, which
I guess technically you are not supposed to do, and I said to her: ‘‘I
really think I should get paid more by the hour,’’ and she agreed.
Then I went back to [the placement agent], and said: ‘‘I’ve spoken to
the client and we are going to bill more.’’
Balancing behavior could also happen when workers used the inter-
mediary to distance themselves from their clients. It was usually in the
interest of the workers to strengthen their relationship with the clients;
after all, this was the source of their pay. Nonetheless, when workers
became too dependent on their clients, the agencies could prove a
useful resource for reducing this dependence. Perhaps the most obvious
example of this behavior was in how agencies protected workers from
the risk of non-payment on behalf of the clients. Even when clients did
not pay for the work, the contractors would be paid by the agencies –
something that would not have happened had the workers been hired
directly by the clients as independent contractors.
Workers could also use the agencies to buffer themselves against
their clients in other ways. For example, when workers had longer-
term relationships with agencies, they might choose to have the agency
intercede for them to resolve problems that they encountered with the
client company. As one contractor told us:
Well, the people that I see every day, that are my direct managers, I
count them as my boss; I’d say they are the people I talk to if I have
any [problems] at work, but if I have any question about the way I’m
being treated or something like that, I would probably go to [the
agency].
In the words of another:
The way you have to do as a contractor for an agency – if you have a
problem you have to talk with the agency, call your agent and tell
him this is what happens and you are going to have to . . . because
I am not gonna react.
For particularly valuable workers, the intermediary might even go so
far as to provide the worker with the rewards that the client was
refusing. One contractor told us:
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I managed to negotiate a week off . . . [T]hey want to renew the
contract, they want to do the same thing for a different client . . . I
have been able to negotiate that, consequently they were able to
negotiate a lower rate with my agent . . . ‘‘Oh, she is asking for a
week off’’ . . . so they are asking for less money . . . I get the same rate,
I don’t pay the difference – I know, because the client told me.
Bargaining and distancing: balancing between client–worker
and client–agency ties
Just as the worker could be active in attempting to disintermediate an
agency, so could the client. Many of the examples of client-led disin-
termediation attempts that we came across revolved around informa-
tion. As Barley and Kunda (2004) note, information about billing rates
tends to be jealously guarded by the agencies, on the basis that it helps
them to maintain higher margins. In response, many clients attempt to
force agencies to practice ‘‘open book’’ pricing, so that all the parties
know what the margin is. Such pressures tend to drive down agencies’
rent, and may also lead to a deterioration in service in the market. One
agency manager told us:
Recently there has been a lot of pressure on margins and clients pushing for
greater visibility of their margins. To be honest, we hate this. We are trying
to run a business, and this pressure for transparency makes that difficult.
We have a $70 million operation in the US, and we are trying to deliver a
quality service. The pressure for full disclosure diminishes what they do by
just focusing on the labor rate . . . People like IBM who pushed for full
disclosure said that they do it because they want to make sure that the
maximum dollar goes to labor. I am not embarrassed to say that we have
shareholders, and so we need to make sure that we are making money
for them.
Such partial disintermediation tactics (pushed by the clients) became
particularly important when agencies were attempting to present what
they did as a service, rather than purely the provision of individuals. By
focusing on the individuals that an agency was providing (and thereby
downplaying the role of the client–agency relationship in providing the
service), clients were able to reduce that agency’s rent significantly.
One client described the process of negotiating with a high-end con-
sulting firm as follows:
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Some of the push back that [the client manager] used was that what
looked like very different people had very similar pay levels. Even
the terminology is different across these people [for different firms] –
so how do you do an apples to apples comparison of the individuals
and roles and peg a price on them? You need to come up with a matrix
of titles in this company versus those in the other. We kind of did this,
but not as formally as we might have . . . However, [the client man-
ager] really saved a lot of money on these projects, pushing back on
these issues.
While the threat of disintermediation was usually damaging to an
agency’s interests, sometimes the agency needed to accept it in order to
conduct the transaction. Some clients might require the option of direct
hiring in order to do business with an agency. For example, when the
bank we studied used offshore personnel via a vendor to manage some
of its key systems, it became highly dependent on the knowledge of
those external workers. This dependence made the bank very vulner-
able to ‘‘hold-up’’ behavior by the vendor during contract renegotia-
tions, as the knowledge about the vendors’ personnel was effectively
irreplaceable. In order to manage this problem, the bank made it a
condition of its use of offshore vendors that it had the right to interview
and employ the vendors’ employees should the relationship between
client and vendor be terminated.
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Figure 5.6 Bargaining and distancing
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It was not always in clients’ interest to engage in such partial disin-
termediation of agencies. Indeed, the reason that clients brought
agencies in originally was to balance their relationship with workers.
Accordingly, clients would often use their relationships with agencies in
order to distance themselves from the workers. For example, when
clients were dissatisfied with particular workers, they would often
leave the job of releasing the individuals involved to the relevant agen-
cies. There were also many situations in which the client would want to
weaken the tie to workers within the context of an ongoing relationship.
The main reason why clients would want to weaken their own ties
with workers was to simplify the process of managing the work. When
agencies took greater responsbility for managing what the workers did
the resources needed by the clients to manage their projects were
reduced. Clients achieved this through more detailed contracts with
agencies, making the agencies responsible for delivery of the services.
This meant that clients could rely on the agencies to do the management.
A senior manager at the bank we studied outlined this logic to us as he
explained how he was trying to train his subordinates to deal with
offshore vendors:
Anecdotal evidence is no longer acceptable to me in talking about
problems with the offshore vendors. My questions would . . . be,
first, should you even be talking to this person? Or is someone else
named as the point of contact in the contract? How does this relate
to the contract? How has it actually affected your performance on
the contract? Are their English skills even relevant to your evalua-
tion of the vendor? [. . .] We want to focus on ‘‘These are the
deliverables. Are they acceptable, on time and on price?’’
Ultimately, you can’t control the other issues, and that’s supposed
to be one of the advantages of outsourcing – you shouldn’t be
worrying about who they hire.
Building a strong relationship with an agency was therefore critical to
the client’s ability to reduce its own contact with the workers. There was
a clear tension, however, between, on the one hand, the client’s desire to
minimize the effort devoted to managing the workers and, on the other,
its goal of limiting agency margins. Reducing the status of the agency
involved to that of a broker enabled the client to lower margins. Limiting
the burden of managing the workers required the client to bring the
agency back into the relationship as an active participant, however.
170 Matthew Bidwell, Isabel Fernandez-Mateo
Taking themselves out: balancing between agency–client
and agency–worker ties11
As we have seen, disintermediation was generally beneficial to clients and
workers, but damaging to agencies. Nevertheless, we did come across
instances in which agencies chose to disintermediate themselves – some-
thing that it would have been difficult to anticipate from most of the
literature on brokerage and intermediation. While intermediating
between clients and workers brought returns in the form of fees, it also
carried costs. Among the most serious of these costs was the prospect that
poor performance on the part of workers would damage agencies’ rela-
tionships with their clients. In a few cases, agencies perceived these risks
to be very high, yet were not able to remove the worker from the client. In
those situations, agencies would encourage their clients to hire the worker
directly. An agency manager described just such a situation to us:
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Figure 5.7 Taking themselves out
11 Isabel Fernandez-Mateo (2007) has analyzed a related kind of balancing
behavior on the part of agencies, which focuses on price setting. In particular, she
finds that intermediaries offer discounts to clients with which they have stronger
relationships (those of strategic importance). Instead of this reducing their
margins, however, agencies are able to transfer these discounts to workers, who
as a result get lower pay rates when assigned to these firms. In a sense, the
agencies are using their relationship with the workers to alleviate the price
constraint imposed by their ties to powerful clients.
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We have had our people do terrible things, like stealing, but had the
client not want to do anything about it. This puts me in a difficult
position, as ultimately we are liable for what our people do. In one
case, we told the client that if they wanted to keep the consultant
they would have to convert them, as we were not prepared to deal
with the liability of having that person on our payroll. The client
then went ahead and converted the person.
Discussion and conclusions
Many new employment relationships are triadic in nature, as opposed
to traditional dyadic – employer–employee – relationships. Instead of
consisting of a tie between a worker and a firm, these relationships involve
three actors in the exchange of employment services: a company, a
worker, and an intermediary of some sort (see also Kunda, Barley,
and Evans, 2002). As a consequence, understanding new employment
arrangements requires the examination of a distinctive feature of
triadic relationships: the fact that all three ties within the triad interact
with each other. We have used concepts borrowed from social exchange
theory (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Blau, 1964) to begin to explore this
phenomenon, by arguing that not only do the terms of exchange between
two given actors depend on the characteristics of the tie between them, but
they are also determined by their ties to other actors. In particular, the
‘‘third relationship’’ can be an additional resource – and sometimes a
constraint – that the parties draw on when interacting with the focal actor.
Workers
Our findings on how relationships within a triad interact with each
other in high-skilled contract labor markets have important practical
implications for workers, intermediaries and clients. Workers involved
in mediated arrangements need to understand the existing tie between
the client and the intermediary in order to appreciate how their
relationship with both actors will evolve. In particular, we have
described several ways in which client–agency relationships can sig-
nificantly affect workers. For example, the strength of the intermedi-
ary’s tie with the worker – including whether the intermediary employs
the worker full-time – depends on whether the intermediary’s tie with
the client relies on claims of expertise and the provision of guaranteed
performance.
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Similarly, workers will be more likely to be ‘‘managed’’ by the inter-
mediary rather than the client when the client–agency relationship is
stronger. Client–agency relationships also influence job assignment, as
agencies’ decisions about which workers to allocate to which projects
depend in part on how the agencies seek to develop their relationships
with different clients. For example, agencies will appoint their most
trustworthy contractors to valued current or potential clients, either to
protect their relationship with them or to strengthen it for the future.
As a result of these processes, workers involved in triadic employment
arrangements need to understand how to make full use of their rela-
tionship with each party in the triad, and be aware that ties are not
just an end in themselves but also a powerful means of shaping other
relationships.
Intermediaries and clients
Our findings also have implications for intermediaries and clients. For
the former, they are a reminder of the central importance of their
relationships with workers in shaping how they deal with clients. For
the latter, they illustrate that ties with labor market intermediaries need
to become an integral part of their human resources strategy. When
using the services of an intermediary, a company is necessarily giving
up some control over how workers are managed. Moreover, its rela-
tionships with workers are now modified by the activities of another
company, which, logically, is pursuing its own agenda. Therefore,
companies need to understand that how they deal with intermediaries
will affect the terms of their relationships with workers, and ultimately
how they behave and perform. One key implication of this argument is
that firms (clients) that are heavily invested in the use of externalized
work arrangements need to incorporate their strategies for dealing with
intermediaries into their companies’ general HR strategies. All too
often decisions are ad hoc and left to the discretion of individual hiring
managers, which might have unintended consequences for the success
of flexible staffing arrangements (see Bidwell, 2006).
We should also reconsider the symbiotic relationship between
employment intermediaries and the legal institutions surrounding
employment (at least in the United States). The basic structure of legisla-
tion on topics such as benefit provision and industrial relations is pre-
dicated on the fact that workers have a single employer. These
assumptions have, in part, helped to spur the growth of triadic
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employment relationships, as client firms have looked to intermediaries
to escape some of the more burdensome obligations attached to employ-
ment, such as the provision of benefits. The growth of these triadic
arrangements, though, is undermining the policy goals enshrined in the
legislation, as clients become increasingly able to pick and choose which
obligations and for which workers they will retain responsibility for.
How best to revise the regulatory framework to recognize the reality
of modern employment is a tricky question. On the one hand, modify-
ing legal frameworks to make it simpler to identify client firms as
co-employers would bring the legal system closer into line with the
economic reality. On the other hand, industry responses to the Vizcaino
ruling over Microsoft’s temporary workers (e.g. Barley and Kunda, 2004)
show how increasing employers’ obligations to external workers can
simply lead to more elaborate schemes to distance clients from workers,
quite possibly to the detriment of both parties. Triadic employment
arrangements are therefore likely to remain a difficult challenge to public
policy for the foreseeable future.
Our qualitative findings also have implications for future research on
contingent and intermediated employment. In particular, they argue
for the need to examine these work arrangements as systems of ties, in
which relationships interact in order to influence outcomes such as
wages, task assignment, and employment security. We have offered
some examples and patterns of these interactions, which could be used
to develop specific hypotheses and test them using quantitative data
sets (for a first effort to do this, see Bidwell and Fernandez-Mateo,
2006). In particular, a question that arises from our qualitative field-
work is this: what are the circumstances under which specific ties will
reinforce as opposed to balance each other? We need to extend this
research using data from other occupations and types of intermedi-
aries. In particular, we have argued that triadic employment arrange-
ments are becoming more prevalent in the labor market, and that they
include not just staffing agencies but also other actors such as out-
sourcing and even professional services companies. Studying how these
interactions play out in other triadic settings should improve under-
standing of this increasingly important sector of the labor market.
The growth of triadic employment arrangements raises other
questions for future research. For example, to what extent does the
growth of external employment (employment through intermediaries)
affect inequality within the labor market? We might suppose that
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intermediaries offer client firms the opportunity to cut back on their
obligations to some of their most vulnerable workers, such as low-
skilled employees, increasing the gaps between the most and least
successful. On the other hand, we have seen how intermediaries offer
workers new opportunities for action. It is conceivable that some
disadvantaged workers may actually find that triadic arrangements
allow them to overcome obstacles to their advancement in more tradi-
tional relationships. For example, arrangements of this type could
work as a stepping stone to permanent employment for workers who
are having trouble finding regular jobs. Either way, it is important to
gain a deeper understanding of who wins and who loses in triadic
employment relationships. William Bielby and Denise Bielby (1999)
have made an early attempt to address this question in the context of
the film industry, but much more work remains to be done.
A third area that needs to be investigated relates to the sustainability
of triadic arrangements. The dynamics of reinforcing and balancing
highlight a certain tension in triadic arrangements. Workers are mana-
ging important relationships with two separate organizations with
interests that sometimes align and sometimes conflict. It is possible
that, over time, these dynamics will lead workers to become more
clearly identified with one or other employer, effectively breaking up
the triad. Examining how and whether workers and firms are able to
balance these tensions over time will help us to understand whether
triadic employment will continue to be an adjunct to more traditional,
dyadic relationships, or whether they will become a precursor to the
widespread adoption of network forms of organization.
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